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Constitutional Civil Law
by Albert Sidney Johnson*
During the 1995 survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit ("Eleventh Circuit" or "Court") was influenced by
the Supreme Court of the United States (the "Supreme Court"),
application of the effect of its earlier decisions, and a number of cases of
first impression. The Court was required to modify its long-standing
practices of pendent appellate jurisdiction1 and scope of review2 in
cases involving qualified immunity defenses. The Supreme Court's
refinement of the definition of "deliberate indifference' influenced
several of the Court decisions relating to the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court considered
several cases of first impression relating to consent searches, constitutionality of anti-nepotism policies, and the relationship of substantive
due process considerations to involuntary resignations. One of the
Court's major cases 4 of the 1994 survey period was applied in a variety
of settings during the 1995 survey period.
I. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
A.

Immunity

Qualified Immunity. Government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

* Partner in the firm of Johnson & Montgomery, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1956); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., 1959).
1. See Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1203 (1995).
2. See Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995).
3. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1973-74 (1994).
4. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, McKinney
v. Osceola County Bd. of County Comm'rs., 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).

745

746

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'
The Eleventh Circuit uses a two step analysis to determine whether
qualified immunity is available. First, the defendant must show that he
acted within the scope of his discretionary authority.' Once the
defendant has made such a showing, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant violated the plaintiff's clearly established statutory or
constitutional right. 7 A government official acts within his discretionary authority if the actions were (1) undertaken pursuant to the
performance of his duties and (2) within the scope of his authority.'
Clearly Established Law. The majority of cases decided by the
Eleventh Circuit under the qualified immunity doctrine focus on a
determination of whether the plaintiff has shown that a defendant's
conduct violated clearly established law. In Anderson v. Creighton,' the
Supreme Court determined that the constitutional right alleged to be
violated must be sufficiently established to inform the official that his
conduct violated the law when viewed in light of the information
available to a reasonable official.1" The Court in Anderson established
that the viability of an "objective reasonable" standard in preserving
immunity depended on the "level of generality at which the relevant
'legal rule' is to be identified."" The Anderson rule has been expressed
by the Court in terms that "[flor qualified immunity to be surrendered,
pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or
allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated,
reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates
2
federal law in the circumstances.""
In Flint Electric Membership Corp. v. Whitworth, ' the Court had

occasion to consider the clearly established law issue in the law of the
case context. The Court had previously held that the individual
defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity."' Thus, the prior

5. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
6. Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994); Ziegler v. Jackson, 716 F.2d
847, 849 (1th Cir. 1983).
7. 38 F.3d at 1565; 716 F.2d at 849.
8. Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988).

9. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
10. Id. at 641-42.
11. Id. at 639.
12. Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(emphasis in original).
13. 68 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1995), modified, 77 F.3d 1321 (1996).
14. Pataula Elec. Membership Corp. v. Whitworth, 951 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (lth Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 302 (1992).
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decision denying qualified immunity would be binding as the law of the
case unless "(1) new and substantially different evidence material to the
issue has been presented; (2) controlling authority has been rendered
which is contrary to the law of the previous decision; or (3) the earlier
ruling was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice if
implemented." 5 In this contract bid and award case, the Court found
that the state contracting procedures vested the plaintiff electric
membership corporations with a property right." However, in light of
new law 7 and a ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court which had
provided procedural relief in similar contract cases, the Court found the
law of the case no longer binding and qualified immunity applicable.' 8
D'Aguanno v. Gallagher involved four homeless persons who lived
in shelters they had built in a homeless campsite on undeveloped private
property.20 They were visited at least once a month by sheriff's
deputies who routinely requested identification from them.2 ' At the
request of the property owner, the deputies entered the campsite and
removed the squatters' shelters and personal property.22 The squatters
brought a section 1983 action for damages against the sheriff and the
deputies alleging First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment violations, as well
as an action for injunctive and declaratory relief and violations of state
law.23 The Court reviewed the district court's grant of defendants'
motion for summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs' causes of action24
and held that the district court erred in concluding that the defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity on the claims for violation of state
law."' Furthermore, the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief

15. 68 F.3d at 1312 (citing United States v. White, 846 F.2d 678, 685 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 984 (1988)).
16. Id. at 1313.
17. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
898 (1995) (Section 1983 substantive due process claims arising from nonlegislative
deprivations of state-created property rights are no longer cognizable in the Eleventh
Circuit.).
18. City of Atlanta v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 260 Ga. 658, 398 S.E.2d 369 (1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 928 (1991) (When a government entity has frustrated the bid process and
awarded the contract to an unqualified bidder, the injured low bidder may bring an action
for appropriate relief.).
19. 50 F.3d 877 (11th Cir. 1995).
20. Id. at 878.
21, Id.
22. Id. at 879.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Andreu v. Sapp, 919 F.2d 637, 640 (11th Cir, 1990)).
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because qualified immunity is a defense only to claims for monetary
relief.2" Addressing the constitutional claims, the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's First Amendment associational and peaceable assembly claims because it was not clearly
established that people have a right to pursue such rights on the
property of another without the owner's permission; 7 there was no
clearly established Fourth Amendment law that society recognized
plaintiffs' expectation of privacy under the facts of this case;2" nor was
there any clearly established Fifth Amendment due process law that
states circumstances in which homeless persons retain a property
interest in the shelters they erect or whether homeless persons retain a
property interest in shelters erected and property stored without
permission on private property."
Rogers v. Miller" arose from a retaliation claim for First Amendment
political speech in a sheriff's re-election campaign. Several deputies (the
plaintiffs) supported the unsuccessful campaign of the sheriff's oppoOther deputies sought to persuade them to support the
nent."
incumbent. 2 These efforts at persuasion were interpreted by the
plaintiffs as threats and intimidation. 3 Following the election, the
plaintiffs were transferred to positions in which they would not be under
the direct supervision of the deputies who supported the sheriff.3' The
transfers did not involve demotions in pay or rank for the plaintiffs,
although they claimed hardship or loss of supervisory responsibilities.3"
The plaintiffs claimed the new assignments were retaliatory and
constituted constructive discharges from their former positions.'
The Circuit reversed the plaintiffs' appeal from denial of the qualified
immunity defenses on two points: (1) there was no clearly established
law that a plaintiff in a section 1983 lawsuit may not be transferred to
a position involving no loss of pay or rank, in order to relieve the
concerns of defendant-supervisors, who reasonably believe that their
ability to effectively direct and discipline a subordinate plaintiff was

26. Id. (citing Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1993)).
27. Id. at 880,

28. Id.
29. Id. at 880-81.
30. 57 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 1995).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 988.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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compromised as a result of the underlying litigation; 7 and (2) there
was no clearly established law in which warnings of the type involved
here or attempts to sway a government coworker's political views have
been held actionable under section 1983.88
In Hartsfield u. Lemacks, 9 a deputy sheriff was not entitled to
qualified immunity from a homeowner's section 1983 claim when a
search warrant was executed at the wrong house." Clearly established
law required the deputy to make a reasonable effort to identify the
property to be searched.4 1
Lenz v. Winburn 2 involved a rare instance where a defendant failed
to show that she was acting within her discretionary authority. The
guardian ad litem for a minor participated in a search of the minor's
residence in attempting to obtain the minor's clothing and other
belongings when she was removed from her father's custody.4' Although the guardian is expected to be a monitor and protector, the
defined scope of her duties excluded nonjudicial functions." Under
these circumstances, it was not necessary to determine whether the
underlying Fourth Amendment search issue was clearly established.4 5
In another case, a jail visitor was arrested when a routine computer
search revealed outstanding warrants on bad check charges.4" She
The
advised'the deputies that she had reported the check stolen.'
deputies were also aware that the underlying charges were possibly time
barred under the statute of limitations." In granting the deputies
qualified immunity, the Court held that, when the case arose in 1992,
the law was not clearly established that the Fourth Amendment forbade
an arrest based upon an otherwise valid warrant if the arresting officers
knew the statute of limitations period had run."'
Williamson v. Mills5" also involved a qualified immunity determination where an arrestee contended he was falsely arrested in violation of

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 991.
Id. at 992.
50 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 951.
Id. at 954.
51 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1546.
Id. at 1545.
Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1205.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 1206.
50. 65 F.3d 155 (11th Cir. 1995).
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the Fourth Amendment.5 Finding the circumstances of arrest to be
without even arguable probable cause,5" the Court denied qualified
immunity."
In Haygood v. Johnson," the issue was whether a search was illegal
because the deputy sheriff who procured the warrant intentionally and
recklessly omitted material facts from the application.55 The Court
acknowledged that clearly established law holds a search invalid when
facts deliberately omitted from the warrant would have negated probable
cause. However, in analyzing the facts omitted from the application,
the Court concluded that the facts omitted were not so clearly material
their omission
that every reasonable law officer would have known
5 7 that
would lead to a search in violation of federal law.
Probable cause incident to arrests was the focal issue in L.S.T, Inc.
v. Crow.5" An examination of the facts involved in the arrests led to
the conclusion that probable cause existed and the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity.59
Deliberate Indifference. Lack of attention to medical needs,
prisoner suicides, and inmate-on-inmate violence constitute a large
portion of cases involving qualified immunity and claims of deliberate
indifference.
In McCoy v. Webster,' a deputy sheriff was granted qualified
immunity in a section 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to an
inmate's safety.6 ' The case resulted from the deputy's failure to advise
an incoming shift that the inmate had been transferred to a holding cell
after a threat to the inmate's life. 2 A reasonable prisbn official could
have believed that his conduct was lawful in light of the information he
possessed. 3

51.

Id. at 156-57.

52. Id. at 158.
53. Id. at 159.
54. 70 F.3d 92 (11th Cir. 1995).
55. Id. at 93.
56. Id. at 94-95 (citing West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 960 (11th
Cir. 1982) and United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 32"8 (5th Cir. 1980)).

57. Id. at 95.
58. 49 F.3d 679 (11th Cir. 1995).
59. Id. at 684.
60.

47 F.3d 404 (11th Cir. 1995).

61. Id. at 406.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 408.
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In Adams v. Poag, 4 a prison inmate died from;,complications of
asthma.65 In a fact intensive analysis of the ensuing deliberate
indifference claim," the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to
connect supervisory defendants to the death; 7 that the attending
physician, at most, failed to diligently pursue alternative means other
than medication; 8 that the failure of the physician's assistant to
administer stronger medication pending arrival of the physician was a
medical judgment rather than deliberate indifference; 9 and that the
plaintiff had failed to show clearly established law that would lead the
attending nurse to conclude that her actions in treating the inmate
constituted deliberate indifference.70
Haney u. City of Cumming71 involved a prison inmate suicide.
Plaintiff's contention of clearly established law was based on Waldrop v.
Evans.72 The Court held,. however, that Waldrop applied only to
doctors and did not clearly establish parameters of liability as to police
officers.73
Genuine Issue of Material Fact. Early cases, decided in the
Eleventh Circuit applying Johnson v. Jones74 appear to be in a turbulent state. The Supreme Court in Johnson returned to Mitchell v.
Forsyth75 to reconsider the proposition that a claim of immunity is
conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his
rights have been violated.76 Thus, a defendant who is entitled to
invoke the qualified immunity defense may not appeal a district court's
denial of immunity insofar as the order determines whether the pretrial
record sets forth a "genuine" issue of fact.77

64.

61 F.3d 1537 (11th Cir. 1995).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1541.
Id. at 1539-41.
Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1546.
Id. at 1547.
Id. at 1548.
69 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1995).

72. 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding grossly incompetent medical care or choice
of easier but less efficacious course of treatment can constitute deliberate indifference to
inmate's medical or psychiatric needs for purposes of qualified immunity).

73. Id. at 1103.
74. 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995).
75.

472 U.S. 511, 527-28 (1985).

76. 115 S. Ct. at 2152.
77. Id. at 2158.
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Eleventh Amendment Immunity. The Eleventh Amendment
prohibits federal courts from asserting jurisdiction over a lawsuit against
a state, except where the state consents to suit or waives its immunity,
or where Congress overrides the state's immunity.79 Congress has not
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in section 1983 cases.0 To
determine whether the state is the "real, substantial party in interest s1 in an action brought against a state official or agency, the court
considers the law of the state creating the entity.8 2 If the state would
pay any award of damages, it is the real party in interest.8 3
In Cross v. Alabama," the application of Eleventh Amendment
principles barred a section 1983 action for money damages against state
health department officials in their official capacities. 8 However, the
portion of the suit seeking prospective injunctive relief against the
officials in their official capacities is not treated as an action against the
state, and the Eleventh Amendment does not insulate official capacity
defendants from such actions, 8 bar a request for reinstatement, 7 nor
preclude an award of monetary damages against the officials in their
individual capacities."

Absolute Immunity. Two cases during the survey period applied
principles of absolute immunity. In Elder v. Athens-Clarke County,"'
prosecutorial immunity protected a district attorney accused of malicious
prosecution to cover up jailers' alleged beating of a prisoner.'
In Smith v. Lomax,9' absolute legislative immunity was denied to two
county commissioners who had voted to deny a county employee

78. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another state, or by, citizens or subjects of any foreign state." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
79. Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 3 F.3d 1482, 1484-85 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated,
19 F.3d 1370 (1994).
80. Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1990).
81. 916 F.2d at 1524 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 101 (1984)).
82. Id. at 1525 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
280 (1977)).
83. Id. at 1524 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).
84. 49 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. at 1503.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 54 F.3d 694 (11th Cir. 1995).
90. Id. at 694-95.
91. 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995).
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reappointment solely on the basis of race. Voting on the appointment
was an administrative, not legislative, act, 92 and a reasonable commissioner would have known that a vote to replace an employee on account
of race was outside the protection of legislative immunity.'
Appeals from Orders Denying Immunity. Historically, the
Eleventh Circuit has exercised liberally the concept of pendent appellate
jurisdiction to consider appeals of government entities and official
capacity defendants along with appeals, from denials of qualified
immunity." However, the Supreme Court found this practice to be
beyond the appellate authority of a court of appeals in Swint v.
Chambers County Commission."5 Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction
is not available to parties unless they meet the requirements of Mitchell
v. Forsyth" or Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 7 In the
wake of the Supreme Court's holding, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed
appeals based on pendent -party jurisdiction in Swint v. City of Wadley;"5 L.S.T, Inc. v. Crow;- Hartsfield v. Lemacks;'° Pickens v. Hollowell;' Ratliff v. DeKalb County;..2 Barnette v. Folmar;0 3 Babb
v. Lake City Community College; ° Flint Electric Membership Corp. v.
1°5 Haney u. City of Cumming;W06 and Haygood v. JohnWhitworth;
07
son. 1

The Supreme Court also impacted appellate practice in its decision of
Johnson v. Jones,"~ holding when a qualified immunity defense raised
genuine issues of fact concerning police officers' involvement in an
alleged beating incident, the decision of the district court was not a final

92. Id. at 405.
93. Id. at 407.
94. See, e.g., McCoy v. Webster, 47 F.3d 404 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Swint v. City of
Wadley, 5 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. granted sub nom. Swint v. Chambers County
Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2671 (1944)).
95. 115 S. Ct. 1203 (1995).
96. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
97. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
98. 51 F.3d 988 (11th Cir. 1995).
99. 49 F.3d 679 (11th Cir. 1995).
100. 50 F.3d 950 (11th Cir..1995).
101. 59 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 1995).
102. 62 F.3d 338 (11th Cir. 1995).
103. 64 F.3d 598 (11th Cir. 1995).
104. 66 F.3d 270 (11th Cir. 1995).

105.
106.
107.
108.

68 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1995).
69 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1995).
70 F.3d 92 (11th Cir. 1995).
115 S. Ct. at 2156-57.
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decision within the meaning of the appellate jurisdiction statue and,
thus, was not immediately appealable. The Court found in Ratliff v.
DeKalb County; ° Babb v. Lake City Community College;"0 and
Haney v. City of Cumming.' that the district court's judgment was
based on issues of fact which prevented the judgment from being final
and, therefore, appealable.
The final judgment question was also presented in Winfrey u. School
Board of Dade County."2 The plaintiff,'a white female, was removed
from her position as a school principal and replaced with a black
male." 3 She claimed discrimination on the basis of race and gender."" The superintendent and assistant superintendent were granted
summary judgment based on qualified immunity."5 In a decision of
first impression, the Court held that an order granting summary
judgment to fewer than all defendants based on qualified immunity is
not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. 116 An order that
finally disposes of fewer than all the claims, or disposes of the claims
against fewer than all the parties, does not ordinarily terminate the
action in the district court." 7 Such an order is appealable only if the
district court (1) directs entry of judgment as to those claims or parties,
or (2) expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay."'
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Tax Injunction Act" 9 deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to
enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax
under state law except where no plain, speedy and efficient remedy is
available in state courts. Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers"0 resolved the
question whether the Tax Injunction Act prohibited jurisdiction where
a mortgagee contended that lien prioritization of special assessments
under Florida law' 2 ' constitutes a deprivation or impairment of the
mortgagee's property interest. Finding that a mortgage interest is

109.
110.

62 F.3d 338 (11th Cir. 1995).
66 F.3d 270 (11th Cir. 1995).

111.

69 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1995).

112.
113.

59 F.3d 155 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 157.

114. Id.
115. Id
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 158.
Id. at 157 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b)).
Id. (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b)).
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
41 F.3d 619 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 52 (1995).
FLA. STAT. § 170.09 (1987).
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"property" under Florida law,' 22 federal courts have jurisdiction of a
due process claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § i331 as a federal question
arising under the Constitution."
Standing. Article III of the Constitution, addressing the federal
court system, restricts federal court jurisdiction to "cases" or "controversies" and establishes the scope of matters which can be determined by
federal courts. 124 The concept of standing, a party's right to have a
federal forum decide matters, thus has constitutional dimensions. "The
essence of a standing question is whether the plaintiff has alleged 'such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for the illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.'" 25 This principle is supplemented by three
principles of judicial restraint: whether the plaintiff's complaint falls
within the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional
provision at issue, whether the complaint raises abstract questions
amounting to generalized grievances which are more appropriately
resolved by the legislative branch, and whether the plaintiff asserted his
or her own
legal rights and interests rather than those of third
26
parties.

The standing issue was resolved in favor of the plaintiff in Jacobs v.
The Florida Bar. 27 There, members of The Florida Bar had standing
to attack a State Bar rule governing attorney advertising in light of a
credible threat of prosecution where members had used advertisement
in the past which would violate the new rules and asserted that they
would have continued to do so but for the adoption of the new rules.
Ripeness. The ripeness doctrine addresses constitutional and
prudential concerns that a claim does not constitute a "case" or
"controversy" within the meaning of Article III. In the land use context,
because the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the taking of
property without just compensation, a plaintiff asserting regulatory
takings must obtain a final decision that he has been denied state court

122. 41 F.3d at 623.
123. Id. at 622.
124. U.S. CONST. art. III.
125. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
126. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498.(1975).
127. 50 F.3d 901 (11th Cir. 1995).
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remedies for inverse condemnation before the takings claim is ripe. 2 '
The finality prong of the ripeness inquiry is required in order for the
court to determine "the nature and extent of permitted development
before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport
to limit [development].m l2
Two cases decided during the survey period illustrate differing
applications of the ripeness doctrine. In Tari v.Collier County,"3
property owners' due process and takings claims against a county and
county officials were not ripe for adjudication, although the notice of
zoning violation ordered the owners to cease their tree nursery
operations on the property immediately.'
The notice was not a final
decision by .the county, and the owners were advised that further
investigation would be undertaken and that further review was
available. 2
In Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter,'. the Court distinguished
between takings claims and arbitrary and capricious substantive due
process claims, finding that such claims mature at different points in the
process."3 "An as applied substantive due process challenge focuses
on whether the actual decision to apply the zoning to the property was
arbitrary and capricious."' "Thus, such a claim presents a sufficiently concrete question for review when the zoning decision has been finally
made and applied to the property."'"
II. ATTORNEY FEES
Section 42 U.S.C. 1988'3 provides that a district court may award
attorney fees to the "prevailing party" in civil rights actions brought
pursuant to section 1983 and related civil rights statutes. In prior cases,
the Supreme Court has indicated that a plaintiff who wins nominal
damages may be designated as a "prevailing party" for purposes of
128. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2906-07 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. 112 S. Ct. at 2891 (1992) (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo,
477.U.S. 340, 351 (1986)).

130. 56 F.3d 1533 (1lth Cir. 1995).
131. Id. at 1534.
132. Id. at 1536.
133. 59 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1995).
134. Id. at 1212.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides, in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title.., the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1995).
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section 1988."'8 The Court has defined the prevailing party as one
who "succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit""9 and who
establishes a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties.,"140
Ordinarily, a prevailing plaintiff is to be awarded attorney fees in all
but special circumstances."" By contrast, a more stringent standard
applies to prevailing defendants who may be awarded attorney fees only
when a court finds that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable,
foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad
or without
142
faith.
In Head v. Medford," a former city employee's assertion of a
constitutional claim based knowingly on a nonexistent property interest
was legally groundless'" and, accordingly, her federal due process
claims were legally frivolous for purposes of awarding the prevailing
defendant attorney fees. 46
III.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

FirstAmendment

Government Regulation Impacting Speech. In the last survey
period, the Court held in McHenry v. The FloridaBar'" that state bar
rules prohibiting lawyers from using direct mail to solicit personal injury
clients within thirty days of an accident constituted an unconstitutional
restriction on commercial speech. 47 The Supreme Court reversed,'"
holding, in a five to four decision, that the state bar rules did not violate
the Free Speech Clause. 49 The majority analyzed the rules under the

138. See, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1995).
139. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581
F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
140. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93
(1989).

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978).
Id. at 421.
62 F.3d 351 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 356.
Id.
21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994).
21 F.3d at 1044-45.
The Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
Id. at 2381.
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three-prong intermediate scrutiny, test set forth in CentralHudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.50
Public Employment. The Eleventh Circuit addressed the scope of
a public employee's rights of free speech in his role as a citizen on two
occasions during the survey period. A governmental employer's
restrictions or actions violate the First Amendment if the employee was
sanctioned for speaking out on a matter of public concern in his role as
a citizen, and the employee's interest in the speech is not outweighed by
the employer's interest in providing orderly and efficient government
services. 1 ' The "public concern" element is determined on a case-bycase basis by determining whether the content, form, and context of the
speech52 indicate that the speech was a matter of general public concern. 1

In Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores,' a fire chief publicly
opposed paramedic cuts and a proposed public safety officer program.'" His successful efforts were followed by deteriorating relationships between the fire chief and the city council.'55 The city manager
resigned in lieu of firing the chief as ordered by the council.'5 6 The
new city manager, after several months, did fire the chief.'57 The city
did not dispute the chief's First Amendment protection,' but contended that he had no claim after the Court's decision in McKinney v.
Pate.59 The city further contended that, given the passage of time
between the speech and the discharge, no reasonable jury could find that
First Amendment speech was a substantial factor in the discharge."0

The Court rejected both arguments, holding that McKinney did not
disturb a litigant's ability to vindicate fundamental rights through the

150. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (Stating the test as requiring (1) assertion by the government
of a substantial interest in support of its regulation, (2) demonstration that the challenged
regulation advances the government's interest in a direct and material way, and (3)
demonstration that a commercial speech regulation is narrowly drawn).
151. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
152. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
153. 58 F.3d 1554 (11th Cir. 1995).

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 1556-57.
Id. at 1557-58.
Id. at 1558.
Id.
Id. at 1561.
20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
58 F.3d at 1561.
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substantive component of the Due Process Clause,'' and that motive
is a jury question in such a case." In another First Amendment retaliation case," the Court upheld
the employee's claim of biased decisionmakers in an administrative
proceeding.'" 4
Two cases decided during the survey period addressed intimate
association rights in the public employment context. In a case of first
impression, Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 6 the Court held that a
city's anti-nepotism policy did not deny the fundamental right to marry
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Furthermore, such a policy does not infringe the right of intimate
association implicit in the First Amendment.. 7 nor does it have a
disparate impact on women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'6
Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause. An attack1 69 on
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act' 70 alleged that the
plaintiffs had a sincerely held religious belief that abortion is murder
and that the Access Act chills their expression of that belief.17 1 The
Court rejected this claim by holding that the Access Act leaves ample
avenues open for the plaintiffs to express their deeply held belief so long
involve physical force, threats of such force,
as the expression does not
72
or physical obstruction.1
B. Fourth Amendment
In a case of first impression,'7 3 the Court determined that minors
have capacity to give third-party consent to search the premises or
effects that the minor has common authority over or an otherwise
sufficient relationship. 7 4 Because privacy is an intuitive interest,

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1565.
Thornquest v. King, 61 F.3d 837 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 841-42.
43 F.3d 609 (11th Cir. 1995), reh. en banc denied, 52 F.3d 1073.
43 F.3d at 611.
Id.
Id.
Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
18 U.S.C. § 248.
55 F.3d at 1522.
Id.
Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1548-49.
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minors need not necessarily, be presumed incapable of giving knowing
consent. 175 Furthermore, because the youth of the consenting minor is
among factual considerations bearing upon the voluntariness
of the
176
consent, a categorical rule is unnecessary and inappropriate.
C.

Fifth Amendment
Takings cases continue in a regular, but low profile, flow through the
Eleventh Circuit, mostly under the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine. However, the Court decided two cases during the survey
period based on federal grounds. In TRM, Inc. v. United States, 177 a
grocery store owner challenged the store's permanent disqualification
from participation in the federal food stamp program because of food
stamp trafficking by store employees.178 The provision for a full
hearing de novo in the district court following administrative review
adequately protects procedural
due process rights with respect to
7
permanent disqualification. 1
In United States v. 2751 Peyton Woods Trail, S.W., s the government filed a complaint for ex parte forfeiture of property after convincing
a federal magistrate that probable cause existed to believe the properties
were involved in, or traceable to, money laundering under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956 and 1957.'18 On appeal, the Court held that the ex parte
seizure of the properties violated the owner's right to due process and
that the forfeiture must be dismissed. 2
D. Eighth Amendment
In Wilson v. Seiter,'" the Supreme Court clarified the rule that a
prisoner who uses the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause as a basis for a suit challenging confinement
conditions must show a culpable mental state; specifically, deliberate
indifference on the part of the officials named as defendants. The
Supreme Court further refined the definition of "deliberate indifference"
in Farmer v. Brennan,"' holding that the term is essentially equiva-

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 52 F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 1995).
178. Id. at 941-42.
179. Id. at 944.

180. 66 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 1995).
181. Id. at 1165.
182. Id.

183. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
184.

114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
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lent to criminal negligence," requiring a subjective, rather than
purely objective, standard. A prison official may be held liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying human conditions of confinement only
if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate
I
it. S

Farmerv. Brennan was applied in several cases decided by the Court
8 7 a pretrial
during the survey period. In Hale v. Tallapoosa County,"
detainee brought an action against the county, sheriff, and jailer arising
from an alleged beating he sustained from other inmates in a group
cell.' As to the jailer, the Court found the evidence to be insufficient
to support the level of deliberate indifference and causal connection
necessary to hold him personally responsible.' However, as to the
county and the sheriff, past events would reasonably support that a
substantial risk of serious harm existed at the jail, 9 and a jury could
reasonably find that the sheriff failed to take reasonable measures to
abate a known risk of harm if the evidence showed that he knew of ways
to reduce the harm but knowingly declined to act, or that he knew of
ways to reduce the harm but recklessly declined to act.'9 '
In Hardin v. Hayes" the district court granted, on grounds that the
verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, a new trial after a
jury verdict in favor of a city where an inmate of its jail died while
incarcerated.' . The second trial resulted in a plaintiff's verdict on the
theory of deliberate indifference to the inmate's need for mental health
treatment. 94 The Court reversed and ordered reinstatement of the
first jury verdict in favor of the city.'98 To prove deliberate indifference, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate that the relevant city personnel
acted with subjective recklessness, i.e., that their conduct was unreasonable in light of a known risk that delay in mental health treatment

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
52
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1978.
at 1981.
F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).
at 1581.
at 1582.
at 1583.
F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 1995)
at 936.
at 940.
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would cause the decedent mental anguish.'" Whether the plaintiff
made such proof is a jury question."9
In Young v. City of Augusta,' the alleged deliberate indifference
focused on the plaintiff's claim that the city failed either to adequately
select or train jail personnel to deal with inmates suffering from mental
illness or to provide on-site medical treatment.'
Deliberate indifference by city policymakers to the rights of inmates requires proof that the
failing was a conscious choice by policymakers among alternative courses
of action, which in turn, caused the jailers' deliberate indifference. 2"
The policymakers must have had actual or constructive notice that the
particular omission is substantially certain to result in the violation of
the constitutional rights of citizens.20' This may be demonstrated by
either a showing that the need for a particular type of training may be
obvious where jailers face clear constitutional duties in recurrent
situations or by showing that the need for more or better training is
obvious where a pattern of constitutional violations exists such that the
city knows or should know that corrective measures are needed. 2"
The factual circumstances in this case demonstrated genuine issues of
material fact requiring trial by jury.2 "3
The trend produced by Farmer v. Brennan appears to be toward
factual determinations by a jury except in clear cases. In Adams v.
Poag,2 4 the majority held that prison medical personnel were not
deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of a prisoner with asthma.2"' The dissent found there to be genuine issues of material fact
as to whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent. 2"
E. FourteenthAmendment
Property Interest. A substantive due process analysis, within the
deprivation of a property interest context, involves two queries.0 7
First, was the plaintiff deprived of a constitutionally protected property

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 939.
Id. at 940.
59 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1171-72.
Id
Id
Id. at 1173.
61 F.3d 1537 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1548.
Id. at 1548-52 (Clark, S.C.J., dissenting).
Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989).
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interest?.. Second, was the deprivation of that property interest for
an improper motive and by means that were pretextual, arbitrary and
capricious, and without any rational basis?2.
The determination of the existence of a protectable property right was
the focus of Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers,2 1 in which211the Court found
that a mortgage creates a protected property interest.
Substantive Due Process. A major case in the last survey period
was McKinney v. Pate212 where the Court held that areas in which
substantive rights are created only by state law (as is the case with tort
law and employment law) are not subject to substantive due process
protection under the Due Process Clause because substantive due
process rights are created only by the Constitution.213 During the
current survey period, the Court applied the McKinney rule to several
cases but without significant expansion or modification of the rule.214
215 the Court considered a
In Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter,
substantive due process challenge to zoning regulations. 2' Applying
the two-step rational basis procedure set out in Haves v. City of
Miami,1 7 the Court determined that there was a plausible, arguable
legitimate purpose for the application of the zoning regulations unless
the property can demonstrate that the government body could not
possibly have relied on that purpose.2 15

208. Id.
209. Hearn v. City of Gainesville, 688 F.2d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1982).
210. 41 F.3d 619 (11th Cir. 1995).
211. Id. at 623.
212. 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994).
213. Id. at 1556.
214. Wooten v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 696 (11th Cir. 1995) (Substantive due process right
not implicated where public agency is awarded legal custody of a child, but does not control
child's physical custody except to arrange court-ordered visitation with non-custodial
parent); Bussinger v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 50 F.3d 922 (11th Cir. 1995) (Substantive
due process claims controlled by McKinney; procedural due process claims survive
McKinney.); Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554 (11th Cir. 1995)
(McKinney did not disturb a litigant's ability to vindicate fundamental rights through the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, e.g., First Amendment retaliatory
discharge claims.); Thornquest v. King, 61 F.3d 837 (11th Cir. 1995) (Biased decisionmaker
claims are procedural due process claims not precluded by McKinney.).
215. 59 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1995).
216. Id. at 1214.
217. 52 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 1995) (The first step is identifying a legitimate government
purpose which the enacting government body could have been pursuing; the second step
asks whether a rational basis exists for the enacting government body to believe that the
legislation would further the hypothetical purpose.).
218. 59 F.3d at 1214.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The 1995 survey was one in which the Eleventh Circuit made several
adjustments in its docket management process. The Supreme Court cut
short the Court's ability to consider related appellate issues in appeals
from denials of the qualified immunity defense. The Supreme Court's
enforcement of the final judgment provision will likely mean a longer
road for litigants involved in governmental liability issues. Similarly,
since the Supreme Court has tightened the requirement to limit review
of qualified immunity appeals to the "substantially different" legal issues
that are implicit in immunity defenses, consideration of fact based issues
will be deferred to the post-trial appellate process. Further, the
Supreme Court's refinement of constitutional issues involved in
government liability litigation will require a period of adjustment and
incorporation in the Eleventh Circuit. At the same time, the increasing
number of first impression cases forecast a further period of adjustment
as the several panels sort out their own separate views of such issues.

